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Abstract
Network neutrality has been topic of discussion for the past 25 years,
with current legislation/regulation in the US and Europe targeting the
ISPs or “common carriers”. But the reality of the Internet in the 2010s
is that various actors contribute to the delivery of data, with sometimes
contradictory objectives.
In this paper, we highlight the fact that neutrality principles can be
bypassed in many ways without violating the rules currently evoked in
the debate. For example via Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), which
deliver content on behalf of content providers for a fee, or via search
engines, which can hinder competition and innovation by affecting the
visibility and accessibility of content.
We therefore call for an extension of the net neutrality debate to all the
actors involved in the Internet delivery chain. We particularly challenge
the definition of net neutrality as it is generally discussed. Our goal is
to initiate a relevant debate for net neutrality in an increasingly complex
Internet ecosystem, and to provide examples of possible neutrality rules
for different levels of the delivery chain, this level separation being inspired
by the OSI layer model.
1 Introduction
Net neutrality is “the principle that Internet service providers should enable
access to all content and applications equally, regardless of the source, with-
out favoring or blocking particular online services or websites” (e.g., Oxford
Dictionary). This universality principle for the Internet has been present for
a long time in the US. In the 1996 Telecommunications Act [3], the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) declared Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
as “common carriers” providing a public service. In February 2015, it voted
to regulate broadband Internet service as a public utility. The same principle
was adopted by the European Parliament in 2014 with a vote that restricts the
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ability of ISPs to charge specific Service Providers (SPs) [2]. This principle is
often translated as guaranteeing that all packets are treated equally at each
intermediary step.
The network neutrality debate started in the 1990s, amongst growing con-
cerns about the business models of network operators, which have to deal with
several challenging trends, including the increase of traffic volume, the growing
traffic asymmetry between operators, and the fast decrease of transit prices.
Recently, spectacular disputes between major Internet actors1 as well as vehe-
ment reactions from user associations and governments2 have drawn attention
to that debate. Arguments and discussions on possible regulation of the Internet
resulted in refined definitions of network neutrality [6, 10, 12].
In this paper, we show that the current focus on ISPs behavior is too restric-
tive in the era of cloud -based content delivery. Indeed, the regulatory bodies
in the US and Europe–those most active with regard to neutrality–focus on
the ISP/internetwork level, but the value chain in the Internet is not restricted
to only ISPs and Content Providers (CPs). In particular, web portals (es-
pecially search engines) and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) have become
key components in the delivery chain, while they surprisingly remain absent
from the debate. Despite some recurring criticism [11], search engines have not
been forced to conform to any universal policy yet; similarly, to the best of our
knowledge, the only mention of CDNs in official net neutrality reports is from
the Norwegian regulator, according to which “the ordinary use of CDN servers
is not a breach of net neutrality” [9]. Yet, we show in Section 3 that the presence
of a CDN, or biases in search listings, can be exploited against the fundamental
principles of neutrality.
More generally, we think the net neutrality debate should be extended to all
the actors involved in the Internet delivery chain. Our goal is not to discuss the
validity of neutrality proponents and opponents, but rather to make a first step
toward a global framework that would be more appropriate for the definition
of public regulating rules (if any) in the era of the cloud and more generally
of information-centric networks. We present our vision of such a framework in
Section 4. To foster scientific activities, we highlight in Section 5 some topics,
where the rigorous analysis of the supposedly “neutral” network scientists could
be especially appreciated by decision makers.
Net neutrality is a highly politicized topic. We have tried to be politically
neutral and scientifically objective in this article;3 however, we realize that
some readers may interpret some of our statements as being politicized. If so,
we assure that any perceived politicization is unintentional.
1For example, Netflix witnessed a 25% reduction in traffic rates for Comcast users, before
a deal was struck [1].
2See for example B. Obama’s declaration on neutrality in Nov 2014.
3The authors receive funding from Orange (a french ISP) for their research activities, but
the content presented in this paper is solely the responsibility of the authors.
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2 The Internet in the 2010s
2.1 Actors in Today’s Internet Delivery Chain
The Internet model usually considered when discussing the relevance of net
neutrality is a chain of three actors:
users – ISPs – Content/service providers.
ISPs appear as the centerpiece of the debate, being seen as the main interme-
diary in the delivery chain. But many “newcomers” are now in the picture [8],
as illustrated in Figure 1: In addition to the three aforementioned actors,
Regulatory bodies
FCC, ARCEP,
CRTC, OFCOM, ...
Service providers
Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, ... Content providers
TV producers, Holly-
wood, YouTube, Netflix, ...
Device builders
Samsung, Cisco, Alcatel-
Lucent, HTC, ...
CDNs/Cloud
Akamai, Amazon, Cloud-
Front, Limelight, ...
Transit networks
Cogent, Level 3,
CenturyLink, ...
ISPs
Comcast, Verizon, Orange, ...
Users
population, companies, ...
Figure 1: The main categories of actors in the Internet ecosystem; arrows rep-
resent a provider-customer (seller-buyer) relationship.
transit networks often act as intermediaries when users and contents are hosted
by different ISPs; CDNs play a key role by storing content closer to users,
thereby reducing transit costs and improving performance for that content4;
device builders may introduce biases through the features of their products
(possibly colluding with some other actors); and search engines (seen as service
providers) directly affect the accessibility (visibility) of content. Regulatory bod-
ies therefore face the delicate task of defending fairness and universality prin-
ciples in this complex ecosystem, where ever-changing technical and business
conditions prevent (or considerably complicate) analysis and comparison.
4The use of CDNs can be seen as against neutrality principles, since they offer an improved
delivery for a fee, something new arrivants in the market may not be able to afford. We do
not address this question here.
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2.2 An Intricate Delivery Chain
The success of a given CP partly depends on its interactions with other actors.
For example, its visibility is strongly affected by the behavior of search engines,
which leaves space for biases that we point out later. Another example, the
engagement of end-users for a CP is impacted by the delivery performance [4],
which is usually under the responsibility of cloud providers and CDNs. Here
again, non-neutral behaviors from those actors impact the CP.
The actors that have direct economic relationship negotiate Service Level
Agreements (SLAs). In the case of content delivery, the intricate relationships
between actors yield chains of SLAs, which are based on network-oriented met-
rics such as the throughput and the ratio of packet losses. But inferring the
Quality of Experience (QoE) from a chain of network metrics, potentially cas-
cading, is a difficult task. Most CPs struggle both to assess the QoE of their
customers and to identify the failing actor when the quality of delivery is below
expectations.
This complex chain of content delivery and the difficulties to assess the per-
formance of the involved actors potentially leave some room for intermediaries
to favor some CPs against others, thereby violating the principles of neutrality.
We show later that a packet-level interpretation of neutrality can unfortunately
not prevent intermediaries from biasing the competition among CPs.
2.3 Existing Protection Tools
Net neutrality opponents often argue that existing legal frameworks already
protect fair competition, and thus no additional regulation is needed. This is
the case in the US with the antitrust law and the associated Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). Such antitrust arsenals do not however address some of
the points that are frequently raised by net neutrality proponents.
First, the antitrust framework acts reactively and on a per-case basis al-
though the neutrality regulation looks for pro-active solutions. With the an-
titrust framework, an actor that reckons to suffer economically from the (non-
neutral) behavior of another actor should file a complaint with the FTC to ob-
tain redress. The framework requires lawsuits and judgements once a plaintiff
has built a case. On the other hand, neutrality regulation aims at anticipating
the possible problems and preventing them by specifying allowed and forbidden
behaviors.
Second, focusing on competition corresponds to a partial view–since limited
to market aspects–which ignores some other principles raised by net neutral-
ity proponents, such as freedom of speech and innovation fostering (the latter
involving equal access to resources regardless of the monetary capacity of CPs).
In our opinion, neutrality rules are essentially complementary to antitrust
laws, and setting boundaries between the application field of antitrust laws and
that of neutrality rules should be part of the debate as well.
4
3 Examples of Neutrality Breaches
As previously stated, the supply chain between content and users includes multi-
ple intermediary actors, which act in a free market with reciprocate engagements
based on SLAs. We show in the following that these intermediaries can generate
significant biases in the network and create a breach in what represents network
neutrality for most people. We focus on CDNs and search engines, which are
two key actors in the supply chain.
3.1 Competition Biases due to CDNs
First, we consider the impact of a profit-driven CDN provider, by developing
two scenarios depicted in Figure 2. Both scenarios model the economic reality
of the traditional interactions between ISPs, CDNs, and CPs.
𝑂1 𝑂2 𝑂Origin servers
𝐸 𝐸𝑅 𝑠𝑅CDN regional server
𝑞1 𝑞2
𝑞transit costs
per bit/sec
user
user
user
user
user
ISP𝐵
𝐸𝐵 𝑠𝐵
user
user
user
user
ISP𝐴
user
useruser
user
storage costs
per bit
ISP
Figure 2: Two cases of neutrality breaches due to the presence of a CDN. On
the left, two content providers, each with its own origin server, compete for the
storage resources of a regional CDN edge server [7]. On the right, two ISPs are
served by a shared CDN regional server, but one ISP (here ISP𝐵) installs its
own edge server.
A CDN serves a large population of end-users by the means of edge servers,
which are usually located near the Point of Peering (PoP) between ISPs. When
the CDN receives a request, it has two handling options: either (1) fetch the
requested content from the origin server, or (2) fetch the requested content
from the edge server. Option 1 incurs transit costs (which can be low if the
CDN also owns a transit network, but large otherwise), while Option 2 leads to
improved user quality of experience (QoE)5, and no transit costs are incurred.
Thus, in terms of cost and quality, Option 2 should always be chosen; however,
5Note that QoE is mainly affected for services requiring high bandwidth or low latency.
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storage/cache and processing resources at 𝐸 are finite. Hence, some requests
must be handled by Option 1 (fetch from origin server). A rational CDN will
maximize profits by optimizing the balance between Options 1 and 2, playing
on caching decisions at 𝐸 (or possibly on the number/capacity of edge servers).
Note that we focus on static content in these models for the sake of clar-
ity. But the CDN models for interactive services, such as live streaming and
cloud gaming, are not essentially different: the edge server should still reserve
some hardware resources (mostly computing power here) to serve a subset of
users. For example in live rate-adaptive video streaming systems, the edge
server should both get multiple video representations from the origin server and
manage the multiple concurrent requests for the videos.
3.1.1 Biasing the competition among Content Providers
Let us consider the scenario shown in the left part of Figure 2. That scenario is
extensively discussed in [7]. To reach customers in a given ISP, two competing
CPs subscribe to the CDN, which has to share the privileged resources in the
edge server 𝐸 among the CPs. The scientific literature comprehensively studies
the performances of content replacement strategies in dynamic scenarios, but
rarely integrates the economic parameters, namely here: 𝑖) the transit costs 𝑞1
and 𝑞2, which can differ among CPs due to different paths to reach the ISP
of interest; 𝑖𝑖) the charging policy of the CDN, with prices per volume possibly
differing depending on whether users are served from an edge or an origin server.
A profit-maximizing CDN stores in the edge server the content that yields
the largest revenues. If both transit costs 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 are equal, and if the CDN
charges both CPs the same way, then it should store the most popular content.
However, if the transit costs of one CP (say CP1) are higher than the other,
then the interest for the CDN of storing CP1 content in the edge server exceeds
that of storing CP2 content of comparable popularity, which both benefits CP1
customers and harm CP2 customers. In other words, the internal costs of a
CDN can distort competition.
The situation gets even more problematic when the CDN charges CPs differ-
ently. In [7] we study a case based on real popularity measures, CP2 being (on
average) approximately five times more popular than CP1. Figure 3 displays
the “satisfaction” (a normalized customer QoE measure) of both CPs, according
to the ratio of content from CP1 in the edge server.
The “standard scenario” situation corresponds to the “optimal” (for the CDN)
sharing of the edge server when both CPs are charged identically. CP2 being
more popular, approximately five-sixths of the edge server is filled with CP2
content, and the average satisfaction of CP2 customers exceeds that of CP1
customers. Hence the CDN favors the dominant player although both
content providers pay the same price. Note however that the CDN strategy
is the most efficient in terms of traffic reduction and overall satisfaction of end-
users.
Now, assume that one of the CPs pays more for its requests fulfilled by the
edge server. Two of the vertical lines correspond to two extrema where one CP
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Figure 3: Satisfaction for both CP1 and CP2 customers according to the ratio
of the edge server filled with content from CP1
pays ten times the basic price (see [7] for more details). When CP2 pays more
(typically to reinforce its dominant position), the satisfaction gain of CP2 is
small but competitor satisfaction drops more significantly (from 0.94 to 0.89),
possibly leading some CP1 customers to churn. Alternatively, when CP1 pays
more (typically to increase its audience with better quality), the impact is less
spectacular. To summarize, the dominant player can leverage the CDN
to harm its competitors although challengers cannot.
3.1.2 Biasing the Competition Among ISPs
Consider now the scenario depicted in the right context of Figure 2, where a
CDN serves two ISPs. Initially users of both ISPs (labelled 𝐴 and 𝐵) get data
either from the origin server 𝑂 or from a regional “shared” edge server 𝐸𝑅. The
size of the cache in 𝐸𝑅 is chosen by the CDN according to the transit cost 𝑞 from
𝑂 to 𝐸𝑅 (based on traffic) and the storage cost 𝑠𝑅 at 𝐸𝑅 (based on volume).
Now assume one ISP, say ISP𝐵 , installs an edge server 𝐸𝐵 within its net-
work6 with a storage cost 𝑠𝐵 , in order to improve the QoE for its users through
an agreement with the CDN. The profit-maximizing CDN now has four ways to
store content: in none of the edge servers (so only in the origin server), in 𝐸𝑅
only, in 𝐸𝐵 only, or in both 𝐸𝑅 and 𝐸𝐵 .
The appearance of the edge server 𝐸𝐵 can create conflict, in particular when
content previously stored in 𝐸𝑅 gets only stored in 𝐸𝐵 (and no longer in 𝐸𝑅):
the QoE of ISP𝐴 users is then degraded. Such a scenario is more likely to
occur when the storage cost of 𝐸𝐵 is significantly lower than 𝐸𝑅, or when ISP𝐵
traffic is significantly bigger ISP𝐴 traffic. In that case, the content stored in
the regional “shared” edge server 𝐸𝑅 is the “second” most popular in ISP𝐵 , i.e.,
the most popular among the content not stored in 𝐸𝐵 . Thus, agreements
between CDNs and a given ISP can degrade the performances for
users in another ISP.
6In most cases, the ISP owns the edge server, which it rents to the CDN.
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Figure 4 illustrates the impact of edge-server 𝐸𝐵 on the overall satisfaction
(still a normalized QoE measure) for users in both networks, using real movie
request data over two years obtained from a leading French Video on Demand
(VoD) service and including the request origin networks. We set ISP𝐵 as the
network with the highest traffic, and affect to ISP𝐴 the average traffic from all
other networks. The 𝑦-axis shows the ratio between the satisfaction with and
without the edge server 𝐸𝐵 ; the 𝑥-axis corresponds to different storage costs
𝑠𝐵 .
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Figure 4: Impact on user satisfaction of the creation of an edge server in ISP𝐵 ,
computed as the ratio satisfaction with cache 𝐸𝐵satisfaction without 𝐸𝐵 .
We observe that the installation of an edge server in ISP𝐵 has an (expected)
positive impact on the satisfaction of ISP𝐵 users, but also an (undesirable)
negative impact on the satisfaction of ISP𝐴 users. Observe that the latter
exceeds the former for most of the storage cost prices on 𝐸𝐵 : a powerful network
operator does not need to implement any aggressive pricing policy to degrade
the performances of competitors.
3.2 Search engines biasing the access to content
Search engines are the preferred way to discover and access content: according
to ComScore, in 2014 about 21 billion searches have been treated each month
in the US only. Search engines usually present their suggestions corresponding
to keywords into two categories: 1) sponsored results, a list of advertisements
related to the search and clearly defined as such, from which the engines make
money when the links are clicked, and 2) organic results, a ranked list of links,
believed to associate the most relevant items to the asked keywords since pro-
motional results are assumed to be within sponsored links.
To increase revenues, search engines can be tempted to include in the organic
results some results that are not among the most relevant but that can generate
(direct and indirect) short-term revenues. A typical case is that of a content
provider (called CP1) vertically integrated with (i.e., owned by) the search en-
gine. The engine is economically incentivized to rank that content higher [5].
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Such temptation has raised a search neutrality debate, parallel to the one on
network neutrality [8]. We do not target here any specific search engine nor
claim one is biased: our goal is to show through a model that such biases can
be motivated, and to investigate their impact on fairness among CPs.
The model designed in [5] analyzes the temptation to return “non-neutral”
organic results. This model includes a long-term effect: end-users who are
unsatisfied with the relevance of the organic results may stop using the search
engine. The search engine objective is then to maximize its long-term revenue,
which corresponds to the trade-off between the short-term revenue per visit on
CP1 and the longer-term number of visits on the search engine. The model
helps to understand revenue-maximizing ranking strategies and to anticipate
the impact of regulatory interventions for various scenarios. The principle is
illustrated in Figure 5.
Search Engine
ranking policy
resulting in
{︂
average gain ?¯?
average relevance ?¯?
per request
visit rate 𝜆(?¯?)
revenue 𝜆(?¯?)?¯?
average relevance ?¯?
Figure 5: Search engine whose ranking policy produces an average relevance of
results and an average gain. The number of visits (i.e., popularity of the engine)
depends on the average relevance.
Table 1 illustrates, for some arbitrarily chosen numerical values, the differ-
ences in visit rates to CPs due to the revenue-optimal ranking, the resulting
average relevance of the engine’s output, and the revenues it can generate, for
different values of a parameter 𝛽, which represents the average revenue directly
generated per visit to the search engine (via clicks on sponsored links, their
assumed single source of revenue); the smaller 𝛽, the larger the bias because
of larger (relative) incentives to create revenue through integrated CPs. In
this scenario, the impact on the average relevance remains small (around 10%),
but the impact on the visibility and the revenues of CPs is substantial, possibly
threatening the survivability of non-integrated CPs.
4 Toward a Global Framework
Net neutrality proponents often put forward that every packet should be treated
equally, which misses important aspects and does not prevent unfair situations.
Indeed, that proposal focuses on the regulation of the third layer of the OSI
model (the so-called network layer) although the end-users get the results of the
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CP1 other CP CP1 other CP
Relevance revenue revenue visit rate visit rate
Neutral 0.635 0.028 0.0283 0.057 0.057
Non-neutral 0.618 0.066 0.0243 0.112 0.049
(for 𝛽 = 1) (-3%) (+136%) (-14%) (+96%) (-14%)
Non-neutral 0.592 0.084 0.0215 0.140 0.043
(for 𝛽 = .5) (-7%) (+200%) (-24%) (+146%) (-25%)
Non-neutral 0.568 0.093 0.0193 0.158 0.039
(for 𝛽 = .25) (-11%) (+232%) (-32%) (+177%) (-32%)
Table 1: Impacts of ranking when the search engine owns CP1.
policies of all intermediaries on the seven layers. As shown in the previous sec-
tion, intermediaries can introduce significant biases while fulfilling this “neutral”
condition at the third layer.
We therefore call for an extension of the debate to any class of actors having
an influence in the way end-users consume content. Among them, CDNs, as
well as the providers of data-centers, and search engines.
The need is then for a definition of neutrality that would be applicable to all
actors, whose enforcement would prevent the behaviors pointed out in Section 3.
Such a definition would need to go beyond the packet level, and may involve a
classification of all actors into categories, for each of which specific principles
should be followed. The regulation would then be specific to each level; below
are a few examples:
• at the ISP level, no differentiation among packets according to the origin,
destination, service, or price paid (the common suggestion);
• at the CDN level, caching of only the most popular content, independent
of the provider, the type of content, or any monetary aspect;
• at the search engine level, ranking results based only on relevance to the
query (and possibly the user), independent of the result page owner, the
type of query, or possible payment.
Our purpose in the remaining of this section is not to put forward a clear
framework for a new neutrality definition, ideally robust to network evolution,
but rather to launch a discussion in the community towards that goal. To
start that discussion, we hereafter pose a few questions and provide limited and
probably flawed suggestions, which will (hopefully) ignite the debate.
4.1 Where should neutrality be applied?
The whole topology of the Internet should be abstracted to capture all the rel-
evant actors that may introduce inappropriate biases. This effort should not be
restricted to the physical infrastructure, but it should also consider the actors
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that contribute to the consumption of content by any means. Typically, search
engines are not captured by the current framework targeting packet level and
ISPs. This effort should also consider the new actors that are expected to imple-
ment and integrate their network management services into the network devices
compatible with Network Function Virtualization (NFV) standards. More gen-
erally, all actors that transform the content and are part of the delivery should
be considered.
A definition of neutrality should study behaviors (actor actions) at each
actor level : this would imply defining levels for the different types of actions on
content, in a way comparable to the OSI reference model. We would for instance
need to characterize (in terms of level) the services provided by CDNs and by
search engines. Players at a given level/layer should then be neutral in terms of
protocols applied at this level, by avoiding any kind of differentiation through
the compliance of level-specific rules, extending the current rules defined for
ISPs at the network/transport layer.
Note that, unfortunately it is not easy to identify the level at which an actor
plays. For example in France, Skype is considered by the regulator as a virtual
network operator, which thus competes with ISPs, and not as a service (or
application) provider.
4.2 What notion should neutrality be focusing on?
What is the goal of neutrality, what do we want to preserve? The current
focus is about equal treatment: no differentiation would be allowed whatever
the source, application or service; hence some induced notion of fairness.
Among the underlying principles is the universality of access. This is a
baseline (as it only focuses on blocking), but we need stronger constraints in
a neutrality definition. Slowing down some applications, or favoring others, is
generally refused by neutrality proponents and does not conform to the packet-
based equal treatment proposal. On the other hand, the supposed equal treat-
ment at the packet level can be criticized since most Internet applications use
TCP at the transport layer, which leads to unfair qualities of service offered
since the TCP throughput varies with the user/provider distance (it is indeed
inversely proportional to the square root of the round trip time). This charac-
teristic of TCP can harm innovation in regions with bad network quality, even
with perfectly equal packet treatment.
Defining the “no-differentiation” principle when talking about CDNs for in-
stance seems subtle, because CDNs precisely differentiate services when selecting
what content to cache. The notion of neutrality could be in terms of avoiding
money-based differentiation: fairness considerations would help decide what to
cache, but there can be several potential interpretations:
• Should any packet have the same probability to be cached? We do not see
any reason to do that.
• Should it rather be the most popular content which is cached (what is usu-
ally assumed natural to limit the load on the network)? But couldn’t we
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reason differently, by saying that all content providers should be equally
cached, or at the end should offer the same quality of experience (some-
thing not done for the traditional neutrality principle though)?
It seems reasonable to set a “neutrality rule” requiring CDNs to cache the
most popular content, independently of the source identity. But the focus could
also be on reducing the overall network load by favoring the caching of distant
content (that contributes more to the load since using more links) in addition
to considering popularity.
In order to (partially) solve these questions, we suggest to define fairness,
like neutrality, at the layer the actor plays (related to the question “where?”).
This type of definition could also encompass search engines and ISPs. The basic
idea is to have an “equal treatment”, but one could also look at other notions,
such as social welfare, user welfare, or even service welfare (note however that
such efficiency measures are in general incompatible with fairness, an argument
often used by non-neutrality defendants). The goal is to determine whether a
behavior harms the desired goal at the layer it is operating.
4.3 When should it be controlled?
Should we ensure that any newcomer has a particular treatment? Regarding
the current strategies of CDNs, the CPs in their initial stages are disadvantaged
against the incumbents. However, favoring these companies would be in dis-
agreement with the current neutrality rules of equal treatment. It is therefore a
slippery slope, opening the door to “mission creep” situations where new types
of biases would defeat the initial goal of achieving neutrality.
With the current focus of the debate, remark that this question is not really
a problem, but it is if we try to have a broader view of the Internet network.
5 Potential next steps
To conclude this article, we would like to present a few issues to be tackled by
the community.
Taking into account economics in future Internet studies In general
the question of actor profit is rarely central in the literature related to network
and service management. Computer science and electrical engineering scientists
generally aim at maximizing the efficiency of their proposal regarding technical
objectives and not economic ones. Typically, to our knowledge the literature
related to Content Centric Network (CCN) does not deal with the economics
of actors although, in our opinion, the revamping of the Internet cannot be
seriously studied without taking economic factors into account.
Evaluating the impact of possible regulatory policies The role of a reg-
ulating agency is to recommend policies that guarantee widely accepted princi-
ples. As previously mentioned, the stated principles are not (yet?) well defined
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when it comes to neutrality. It is up to the scientific community to provide rig-
orous studies, as unbiased as possible, about potential policies, their impact on
the considered actor level, and also the possible impact on the overall delivery
chain.
Defining and studying new fairness models Our brief discussion in Sec-
tion 4 highlights the lack of a better definition of fairness and in particular the
subtle equilibrium between the guarantee of fair competition among actors pur-
suing similar objectives (the notion of actor level) and the preservation of the
motivation for investment toward satisfying end-users better.
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